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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17252

GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of a violation
of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated

(1953), as amended

(Theft, a felony of the second degree) and the subsequent
Judgment was entered August 7, 1980.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury on July 14, 1980,
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, presiding.
The jury found him guilty of a violation of Section
-6-6-~04,

t~ie

Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, a felony of

second degree.

:ujg~ent

The verdict was entered July 14, 1980.

was entered August 7, 1980 and appellant was

~entenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of
:

~o

15 ·;ears.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the judgment and
sentence of the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was convicted of two counts of theft.
Count I was for Theft of a Vehicle; Count II for Theft of
Property valued at more than $1,000.
On the afternoon of April 11, 1980, appellant
apparently picked up an individual known as "Crazy Fish" while
driving down State Street in Salt Lake City (T. 70).
few hours

fo~~a

The next

appellant and "Crazy Fish" drinking beer and

smoking mari:uana (T. 71, 76).

Appellant claimed he

personally imbibed "[m)aybe eighteen to twenty" cans of beer
in "[f) ive or six hours"

(T. 71).

In the late afternoon appellant and his companion
went to appellant's mother's house at 256 North 800 West in
Salt Lake (T. 60, 72).

Appellant left "Crazy Fish" in his car

while he went inside to get something to eat (T. 72).
A few minutes later appellant's foster sister
entered the home and indicated someone was driving off in
appellant's car (T. 60,
in

p~rsuit

72).

Appellant hastily left on foot

of the indivi5ual driving his car.

-2-
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At approximately 8:00 p.m.

(T. 15) in the area of

600 West and 200 South in Salt Lake, appellant "discovered a
car with the keys in it" (T. 73), which he "took off with"
allegedly to locate his car (T. 73).
The vehicle he "took off with" belonged to Cliff
Bowden, who, with his wife, was visiting Elver Langdon and his
;;i:!:e ( T. 6).

Bowden had been inside for "approximately ten

T,inutes" (T. 10) when he heard his car start up, die, and
;r,:i:ne:1tarily start again ( T. 10).

He knew it was his car as he

haJ removed the muffler and its exhaust was quite noisy (T.
l 0I .
Bowden and his friend Langdon ran out of the house
to see his vehicle spinning its tires "going backward into the
str:eet"

(T. 11).

Bowden testified he "got right up .

the right front fender .

• to

(T. 12) where he saw an

inJividual he identified as appellant operating the vehicle.
There were no other persons in the vehicle (T. 13).

Bowden

testified he had to jump out of the way "to keep from getting
i".it with the vehicle as .

[appellant]

'-·:ith the "tires squealing" (T. 13, 14).

went forward"
Bowden returned to

ris friend's house and reported the theft to the police (T.
l 4I.

The car was recovered about an hour later by the
~-Jlice

(T. 15).

\'/hen Bowden claimed it he noticed that much
-3-
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of the personal property he had in it was missing (T. 16).

He

gave a detailed list of the missing propety in Court (T.
18-32).
As noted above, appellant claimed the car had keys
in it when he took it (T. 73).

This conflicts with the

accounts of Bowden and the arresting officer, Charles Oliver.
Bowden testified the only key was "[i]n my pocket" when he
went to retrieve his car from the location where police
officers had stopped appellant (T. 33, 47).
The arresting officer testified he found no car
keys or property when he placed appellant under arrest (T.
49-52).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE SUBJECT OF VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.
Appellant does not,

in his pleadings, assert the

defense of voluntary intoxication; however, statements made

~

h irr. in his testimony can be cons trued as an assert ion of that
defense at trial.

It therefore became necessary to instruct

the jury on voluntary intoxication to avoid confusion and
err::ir.

-4-
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The facts surrounding appellant's consuming alcohol and
smoking marijuana on the afternoon of the admitted theft were
developed by his own counsel on direct examination.

The

prosecutor sought to clarify the extent of impairment to
appellant's reasoning and functioning abilities on crossexamina t ion.
Appellant testified he consumed "eighteen to
twenty" cans of beer (T. 71) and "[a]

few . . • joints

[cigarettes] or pipe[s]" of marijuana in "six or seven hours
easily"

(T. 76).

When asked by his attorney to "describe ..•

how your feeling was at the time with respect to the alcohol
hou had?"

(T. 75), appellant indicated he was "[m]ad" and

"definitely" intoxicated, having "had a lot to drink"
82).

~.

75,

He indicated he finished the last can of beer twenty to

thirty minutes before he took Bowden's car (T. 76).
On cross examination, the county attorney asked
about the effect of the alcohol and marijuana on appellant on
the day in question.
~0ch

Appellant replied that it had "[t]oo

effect," and that he had some difficulty standing (T.

77), out that he understood what was occurring (T. 78).
The following testimony by appellant seems to
assert some sort of excuse or defense related to his ingestion

J:

alcohol and marijuana.

-5-
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Q:

You are not claiming that the alcohol or drugs had

affected you to the point you did not understand what you

we~

doing?
A:

I think if I were sober--

Q:

That is not the question.

There are a lot of things

people do when they are sober they wouldn't do when they are
not accountable for them.

Are you claiming that you didn't

understand when you took the car?
A:

Really I don't think I did.

Q:

You don't think you knew what you were doing?

A:

Yes.

I really don't think I knew what I was doing (T.

79).

When questioned as to the circumstances surrounding
his taking Bowden's car, appellant was asked concerning
discrepancies in the facts as he remembered them and as others
remembered them.

Appellant attributed his lack of knowledge

to the fact of his intoxication when the events occurred (T.
81) or to the fact that he just could not remember (T. 84). 1
l(a) Bowden testified he and Langdon ran out of the house
and that he "got right up" next to the fender of the
car--close enough to identify appellant as the driver--and
that appellant took off fast ( T. 12-14).
Appellant testified
he did not remember seeing any people when he took the car and
he was so intoxicated he did not know if he took off fast Qr
not (T. 81).
(b)Bowden testified the only key to the car was in his
possession (T. 33, 34).
Appellant testified the key was in
the car ( T. 8 0 ) •
(c) Officer Oliver testified as to appellant's speed anj
evasive maneuvers (T. 44-46).
l\ppellant test":'ied r,e s
right away when he saw the police officer (T. 84, 85).
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Appellant's testimony on cross examination
concerning his condition relative to the substances he had
consumed was full of equivocal, vague answers typified by the
words "I don't know"

(T. 77-82).

He did say he was probably

so intoxicated he did not understand what was being said to
~

i:n ( T.

8 2) •

Appellant testified extensively concerning the kind
and

a~ount

of intoxicants he consumed on the day of the theft,

the period of time during which the intoxicants were consumed,
and the proximity of that time to the time when he committed
the: tneft.

However, appellant's testimony concerning the

extent to which the intoxicants he had consumed on the day of
t~e

crime had affected his powers of perception and

understanding was confused and unclear.
Appellant requested and received an instruction
(t~e

instruction given referred to the "defendant or a

,;itness" (CT 60)) concerning the prior convictions of
witnesses (which in this case included appellant) and the
weight to be given by the jury to those prior convictions in
their consideration of the instant case (the instruction given
-e:ec:-ed to the "defendant or a ·witness" (C'I' 60)).
a"~ees
2

':3t10

Respondent

that even in a case like the one at bar in which the
does :-iot assert that the <'lefendant is a habitual

:~:~~-al

or that there is a common scheme or plan,

it

mig~t

-,-
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be prejudicial to have evidence of appellant's prior
convictions before the jury with no limiting instruction froo
the court to indicate how the jury must consider those
convictions in their deliberations.

Similarly, respondent

contends it is unfair to have extensive testimony concerning
appellant's voluntary intoxication at the time he committed
the crime before the jury with no instruction concerning the
law applicable to voluntary intoxication.

Respondent asserts

it was not unreasonable to give an instruction relative to the
defense of voluntary intoxication. Where testimony before the
jury could raise an inference that such defense was being
asserted by appellant, or in the very least could create doubt
in the minds of some jurors as to how they should consider
appellant's testimony relative to his intoxication, an
instruction as was given in this case was warranted and
appropriate.
Appellant seems to want the benefit of having
extensive testimony as to his inebriated, sorrowful condition
on record before the jury without having that jury fully
advised as to the manner in which they were to consider such
evidence.

To allow such testimony without an instruction to

clarify it and without giving the jury a standard to assess
its importance in this case would be error.

The instruction

in ·roluntary intoxication of which appellant now complains has
avoided error.

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), cited by
appellant,
~·

is inapposite to the issues in this case.

In

the trial court erred in that it neglected to indicate

the "effect of voluntary intoxication" as it related to both
general and specific intent crimes, nor did "the court relate
the legal effect of intoxication to the facts.

•

" Id. at

80.
In the instant case, the crime of Theft and the
included offense of Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle are both
specific intent crimes (CT 68-70).

The court in this case

properly applied the legal effect of voluntary intoxication to
the charges against appellant (CT 67).
In this case, the wording of the first sentence of
instruction 16B (involuntary intoxication)

(CT 67) was taken

almost verbatim from the statutory language cited approvingly
by this court.

amended.

76-2-306 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as

Additions were made to relate the instruction to the

facts of this case.

Appellant does not assert that the

statements in the instruction are inaccurate statements of
Utah law, but only that they are inappropriate to the case at
bar.

The general rule applicable to appellant's
contention that "the instruction on voluntary intoxication
presented a theory of the case advanced by neither the
-9-
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appellant nor the state"

(Appellant's Brief, 8) can be found

in State v. Odell, 227 P.2d 710 (Wash. 1951).

Quoting Corp'Js

Juris Secundum, the court said:

* * * An instruction which correctly
states the law and is based on competent
evidence in the case is not erroneous
even though it is not in consonance with
the theories of either party.
23 C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, § 1312, 912.

* * *

It is not, of course, improper for
the court to instruct the jury that
certain matters do not constitute a
defense, when such is the case; * * * 23
C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1199, 752.
Id. at 720.
There is, then, no requirement that all the
instructions given a jury in a criminal case mesh with some
theory explicitly advanced by either side as long as the
instruction is based on "competent evidence."

Id.

Here the

evidence of appellant's intoxication was derived largely froo
his own testimony.

In State v. Potter, supra, this court

indicated the trial court has a "duty to instruct the jury on
the law applicable to the facts of the case."

Id. at 78

(Emphasis added).
The state has a right to receive an instruction on
voluntary intoxication in cases like the one at bar.
-10-
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In People v. Rogers, 157 N.C.
~~ich

2d 28 (Ill. 1959), in

a larceny conviction was upheld by the Illinois Supreme

Court, the defendant alleged it was error for the trial court
to give an instruction similar to that given, in the instant

case.
Defendant complains about numerous
instructions given by the court at the
request of the State and complains of the
court's refusal to give certain
instructions tendered by him.
The other People's instruction instructed
the jury that voluntary drunkenness was
no defense to the crime of larceny.
Defendant argues that he never intended
to use his drunkenness as a defense and
therefore the State had no right to an
instruction on the subject.
We find that
a considerable portion of defendant's
testimony at the trial was taken up with
evidence of his drinking and intoxication
and two other witnesses who testified for
him limited their testimony to that fact.
With this evidence of intoxication in the
record, the State was entitled to give an
instruction on its theory of the case.
Id.

at 32.
This same reasoning is found

~82

s.w.

2d 424 (Mo. 1972),

in State v. Lincoln,

in which the Missouri Supreme

:c~rt

upheld defendant's conviction for burglary and stealing

~~ile

rejecting his assertions that the trial court committed
-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

error in giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication when
defendant had not asserted that as a defense.
The record shows that the matter of
defendant's asserted intoxication was
referred to only in interrogation on
behalf of defendant.
He testified
himself at some length on the subject ....
There were numerous instances in which
the subject of defendant's intoxication
was referred to.
Under these
circumstances, the giving of the
instruction was proper.
Id. at 426 (Citation omitted)

s.w.

2d 397

(~o.

[Accord:

State v.

Zerban, 412

1967)].

The origin of this rule in Missouri is found in
State v. Sawyer, 365 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1963) where the Supreme
Court upheld a conviction of first degree robbery.
In Instruction No. 3 the court
instructed that voluntary intoxication is
nc excuse for the commission of crime.
Defendant assigns error, saying
intoxication was not raised by him as an
excuse or reason for the acts that
allegedly took place.
The record is
replete with testimony concerning heavy
drinking by and the intoxication of both
defendant and Boyer.
Defendant testified
he was sick from drinking and a little
intoxicated at the time of the robbery.
It is the accepteo rule that
voluntary intoxication is not an excuse
for the commission of crime....
Our Rule
26.02 states "the court, whether or not
it shall have been req~ested so to do by
either party, must instruct the jury in
writing upon all questions of law
-12-
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-necessary for their guidance in returning
their verdict * *." Assuming that the
instruction is outside the scope of the
mandatory instructions contemplated in
Rule 26.02 .
. this does not mean that
the trial court may not or should not
give it.
Even though defendant takes the
position in his motion for new trial that
he was not relying on drunkenness as an
excuse for his alleged acts, his
testimony and that of others placed that
subject before the jury.
It was in the
interest of justice to give the jury for
their guidance in returning their verdict
the applicable law on this subject before
them under the evidence, and the trial
court did not err in so doing.

re.

at 492 (Citations omitted).
In People v. Conlev,

243 P.2d 874 (Cal. 1952), the

defendants' conviction for assault was upheld by the
California Court of Appeal.

Defendant contended the trial

court had erred in giving various instructions to the jury.
The third was the usual instruction to
the effect that no act is less criminal
because it was committed by a person
while in a state of voluntary
intoxication.
It is argued that these
instructions were improper since no such
defenses were raised.
The appellant
relies on People v. Silver, 16 Cal. 2d
714, 108 P.2d 4, where it was held that
in a close case a misleading instruction
on an issue not raised is prejudicial
where it may have confused the jury on a
matter vital to the defense.
No such
situation here appears.
These matters
were not vital to the defense and there
is nothing to indicate that the jury was
confused or misled.
In Conlev,

the

~efendant

~ad

testified he was

-13-
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not drunk, but "there was evidence to support a contrary
inference, and the instruction on intoxication was neither
erroneous nor harmful."
The rule,

Id.

as stated by the California Supreme court

in Peoole v. Silver, 108 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1940), cited

in~,

supra, is:
Where errors in instructions occur,
the question always arises as to whether
or not they are prejudicial.
Here it may
be said that where the proof of a
defendant's guilt is clear, and no
extenuating circumstances appear, such
errors may not be prejudicial.
But where
a case,
is what may be termed a
"close" case, and where the erroneous
instructions concern matters vital to the
defense of the defendant, and may have
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we
are of the opinion that such errors must
be regarded as prejudicial and should
result in a new trial for the defendant.
Silver, supra, at 9.
In the instant case, respondent submits there was
no error in giving the instruction on voluntary intoxication.
The instruction itself was a correct statement of the law.
The matter of appellant's intoxication was not "vital" (_!.i.)
to r.is defense.

The record discloses the jury had an adequate

found3tion on which to base their inferences and conclusions
as they evaluated the testimony and evidence presented by all
the witnesses,

including appellant.

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-As appellant indicates (Appellant's Brief at 4),
the jury was fully aware it could find him guilty or not
guilty of Theft of a Vehicle or the lesser included offense of
Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle (CT 63, 64, 81).

Finally, this

was not a "close" case in the meaning of Silver, supra.
The cases do not disclose any essential distinction
between the terms "excuse" and "defense" as used in the jury
instructions in this case, and respondent submits there is no
distinction uorth noting.
Respondent submits that where evidence of a
defendant's intoxication at the time he committed the crime
co~es

before the jury for their consideration and this

evidence was derived largely from defendant's testimony, the
state is entitled to an instruction on that subject.
POINT I I

AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE
"REASON AB LE ALTERtlATIVE HY POTH ES IS"
THEORY WAS NOT REQUIRED AND WOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPERFLUOUS AS A CORRECT INSTRUCTION
ON REASONABLE DOUBT HAD ALREADY BEEN
GIVEN.
Appellant contends that (1)

it was error to deny

his request for an instruction on the reasonable alternative
~1~0JCJthesis,
t~e

claiming that the evidence supporting Count II of

information (relating to the theft of property inside the
-15-
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stolen vehicle) was "entirely .

. circumstantial"

(Appellant's Brief at 9) and subject to alternative
conclusions. 2

2) Appellant further contends that there is

danger that in the absence of such an instruction the jury
would not understand that if there were another explanation
for defendant's conduct giving rise to a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt, he should be acquitted.

( 3) Appellant further

contends that failure to give the requested instruction coulc
result in confusion as to the State's burden of proof.
Appellant's first point is without merit.

Bowden' s testimony

was direct evidence from which the jury could draw inferences
as it recreated the facts,

reconciled conflicts in a

reasonable manner, and determined the weight to be given the
evidence before it.

2•A distinction is drawn between direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence.
Evidence is direct when the witness
testifies as to the facts in dispute on the basis of his own
knowledge of them.
Circumstantial evidence assumes a witness
who has no knowledge of the facts in dispute, but knows of
other facts and circumstances which, when offered in evidence,
may permit the fact finder to infer that the facts in dispurt
existed or did not exist.
The inference will be drawn if, in
accordance with the common experience of mankind, a reasonab~
relationship may be perceived between the known facts and
circumstances and the facts sought to be proved.
In terms of
implementation, however, there is no distinction between
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence
•.~harton' 0
C:-i:-.inc.l Evidence 4 (13th Ed. 1972).
-16-
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Assuming, arguendo,

that all the evidence on which

a?pellant's conviction was based was circumstantial,
respondent suggests there is no reason why it should be
accorded less weight than so-called direct evidence.
A?pellant suggests that because evidence is circumstantial, it
is somehow less probative than direct evidence and therefore
s~spect,

requiring a reasonable alternative hypothesis

instruction.
In this regard, Justice Wilkins had this to say in
his concurring opinion in State v. John,

586 P.2d 410 (Utah

19781.
I do not agree with the majority
opinion's comment that ".
despite
whatever weaknesses circumstantial
evidence may have, it is recognized as a
valid method of ascertaining the truth"
because it implies that generally this
class of evidence is inherently less
reliable than direct evidence.
I do
however otherwise concur in the opinion.
The weight to be given to direct
evidence is not--as a matter of
law--necessarily greater than that given
to circumstantial evidence.
I believe an
accurate statement of the law appears in
30 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 1126, where
it states:
Many decisions are to the
effect that circumstantial evidence in a

-17-
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criminal case may be fully as satisfying
as positive testimony and will sometimes
outweigh it.
In cases where the facts or
circumstances which are proved are not
only consistent with the guilt of the
defendant, but also inconsistent with his
innocence, such evidence, in its weight
and probative force, may surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the jury .•.
Circumstantial evidence deserves a like
consideration as to the sworn statements
of a witness and may disprove the
testimony of living witnesses, and there
is nothing in the nature of
circumstantial evidence that renders it
less reliable than other classes of
evidence (Citations omitted).
Id. at 413.
In this case the court instructed the jury that:
Where •
[a]
. conflict cannot be
reconciled, you are the final judges and
must determine from the evidence what the
facts are.
[Y]ou should carefully
and conscientiously consider and compare
all of the testimony, and all of the
facts and circumstances, which have a
bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are.
You are
not bound to believe all that the
witnesses have testified to or any
witness or class of witnesses unless such
testimony is reasonable and convincing in
view of all of the facts and
circumstances in evidence.
[I]f you
believe a witness has wilfully testified
falsely as to any material fact in this
case, you may disregard the whole of the
testimony of such witness, or you may
give it such weight as you think it is
entitled to.
(Inst~uc~ion

#8, CT 57).
-18-
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The two versions the jury had before it regarding
the missing property were:

(1) Mr. Bowden's testimony as to

what property was in the car when he and his wife entered the
Langdon residence (T. 16-32); and (2) appellant's assertion
that he saw no property in the car when he took it (T. 74).
The fact that the vehicle sat for about 10 minutes before
a;ipellant drove it away and the fact that appellant claimed he
left the vehicle unattended for a similar period were also
known to the jury ( T. 35, 74).
The jury could give whatever weight it wanted to
the inference someone other than appellant took the property
inside the car, or that the property never existed in the
: irs t place.

Based on the apparent inconsistencies in

a;ipellant's testimony when factual assertions made by him are
compared with the assertions of other witnesses, it is
reasonable that the jury chose not to give as much weight to
a~pellant's

version of these facts as it gave to the versions

given by other witnesses (See note 1, p. 6, supra).

It was

the jury's prerogative to reach its conclusions based upon the
e~idence

adduced at trial, and to decide which of the

"'itdesses to believe or disbelieve.
Appellant's second and third points can be disposed
Appellant has not shown why the alternative
~~00thesis

instruction was required.

There has been no

-l9-
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authority cited which supports the contention that the
omission of the alternative hypothesis was improper.
The standard in Utah as to the giving of such an
instruction was stated in State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah
1977); and State v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960):
[W]here the only proof of material fact
or one which is a necessary element of
defendant's guilt consists of
circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must reasonably preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of
defendant's innocence .
This rule is applicable only where the
Jroof of a ~aterial issue is based solely
~~ circumstantial evidence
355 P.2d at 59, 60 (emphasis added).

The principle was cited

and reaffirmed in State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah
1970); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v.
Durr.as, 554 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1976); and State v. Bender, 581
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978).
As was pointed out above, the proof in this case
was not solely circumstantial as it related to the theft of
Mr. Bowden's property.
In State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 485 (Utah 1961), a
similar situation to the one presented before this Court
existed in that the defendant's version was totally different
fro~

t~at

of the prosecution's, especially as to the issue
-20-
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of intent.

There, the Court refused to give a reasonable

hypothesis instruction,

saying that the jury must decide which

version of the evidence to believe:
The difficulty with defendant's
position is that the rule he relies on is
not applicable where, as here, there is
dispute in the evidence and one version
thereof does not support his thesis.
He
errs in assuming that the jury was
obliged to believe his story as to what
happened
Id.

at 487.
This Court recently affirmed the rule that an

alternative hypothesis instruction is superfluous.
Eagle, 611P.2d1211

(Utah 1981).

State v.

This rule has been gaining

~ornentum

in other jurisdictions as well as in the federal

courts.

Basically,

the analysis is as follows:

"[S]ubstantial evidence" is necessary to
warrant submission of a case to the jury.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, of
course, is a jury question.
. The
substantial evidence required to warrant
a conviction may be either circumstantial
or direct.
. The probative value of
evidence is not reduced simply because it
is circumstantial.
. The probative
value of direct and circumstantial
evidence is essentially sirr,ilar, and
there is no distinction as to weight
assigned to eac'"i.
.r.. conviction may be
sustained on circumstantial evidence
alone.
. The pr:osecution is no longer
reaui red, in a case based wholly upon
circumstantial evidence, to negate every
conceivable hypot~esis of innocence ....
-~l-
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State v. Blevins, 623

P.2d 853, 856 (Ariz. App. 1981)

(Citations omitted).
This Court said in State v.

Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211

(Utah 1981):
In regard to the propriety of the
so-called "reasonable alternative
hypothesis" jury instruction, any
controversy over its use constitutes
nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.
The prosecution's burden of proof in any
criminal case, whether the evidence be
direct or circumstantial, or a
combination of both, is that of beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The use of the
reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction is merely one way of
expressing that necessary burden of proof
an] there is no apparent reason to
mandate that one, and only one,
particular instruction be used by trial
judges in conveying to the jury the
meaning of that elusive phrase, "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
It may well
be that one of our astute jurists may
make even a substantial improvement of
the reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction, if in fact one has not
already done so.
In any event, the
"reasonable doubt" instruction given in
the instant case clearly and
appropriately informed the jury of the
legal standard to be applied.
Id. at 1213 (See also:

State v. Stacks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utar

1981); State v. Lamb, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980); State v. King,
604 P.2d 923 (Utah 1979); State v. Peoples, 605 P.2d 135, i41
(!\a:-is. 1980); State v. Seelen, 485 P.2d 826, 828-9 (Ariz.
19 7 l) •
-22-
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The test,

then,

is whether the "reasonable doubt"

instruction given in a case "clearly and appropriately
inform[s]
Eagle,

the

supra,

jury of the legal standard to be applied."
at 1213.

Even assuming, arguendo,

that the.evidence was all

circumstantial, an instruction on reasonable alternative
hypothesis need not be given.
348 U.S. 121, reh. denied 348

In Holland v. United States,

u.s.

932 (1954),3 the

petitioners assailed the refusal of the trial judge to
instruct that where the Government's evidence is
circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.

The Supreme Court admitted that

there was some case law supporting that type of instruction,
but then stated:
. the better rule is that where
the jury is properly instructed on the
standards for reasonable doubt, such an
additional instruction on circumstantial
evidence is confusing and incorrect
[citations omitted].
Circumstantial evidence in this
respect is intrinsically no different
from testimonial evidence.
Admittedly,
circumstantial evidence may in some cases
point to a 11holly incorrect result.
Yet
this is equally true of testimonial
evidence.
In both instances, a jury is
asked to weight the chances that the
evidence correctly points to guilt

~

2'2 e

' . ~:. r.

lsc:
United S~ates v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 246
i r- • 1 9 s 1 ) ; 'Jn it e d scat es \. . Patterson , 6 4 4 F . 2 d 8 9 0 , 8 9 4
ir. 1981); ~·nited States\'. Di:'.:lskin, 64-1 "'.2d ·118, 420
ir. 1981).
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against the possibility of inaccuracy or
a.mbiguous inference.
In both, the jury
must use its experience with people and
events in weighing the probabilities.
If
the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, we can require no more.
suora, at 139-140.
The law is primarily concerned that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
amended.

Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-501

There is no need to risk confusing the

(1953), as

jury with

instructions to the effect that if the evidence is
circumstantial it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other

tha~

guilt.

If a jury, upon weighing all evidence

whether circumstantial or direct, is convinced of a
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the law is
satisfied.
An instruction on reasonable doubt provides an
understandable criterion for decision making; an instruction
on reasonable alternative hypothesis is unnecessary and may
confuse the

jury.

In the instant case, the jury was properly

instructed on reasonable doubt.
T~e

See Instruction #7 (CT 56).

trial judge evidently concluded a reasonable alternative

hypothesis instruction was superfluous.

Such a determination

was within his discretion and was properly exercised.
The jury in ttis case, consistent with their
careful instruction on reasonable doubt, logicslly excluded
all reasonable alternative hypothesis by their guilty verdict.
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-Appellant has not only failed to show that his requested
instruction is required but has also failed to show that if it
w0uld have been given in this case,

it would have made some

difference.
Even if the trial court had erred in refusing to
give the requested instruction,
harmless.

that error would have been

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30; Utah

Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1980).
whole, require the

The instructions, when read as a

jury to consider the testimony of appellant

in reaching its verdict (See Instruction 23, CT 74).
Instructions Numbers 7 and 8 (CT 56, 67) instructed
the Jury to weigh and consider all of the evidence and
circumstances shown by the evidence in arriving at a verdict.
Instruction Number 10 (CT 59)
defendant

informed the jury that the

is a competent witness and that his testimony should

be weighed the same as that of any other witness.

Instruction

Number 5 (CT 54) required the

jury to impartially consider and

compare all of the evidence.

Instruction Number 3 (CT 53)

Lequired the

jury to find

reascnable doubt exists.
l <9 O ( :_} t ah

ap~ellant

not guilty so long as a

See State v.

'laestas,

564 P. 2d 1386,

19 7 7 ) .
The weight of both state and federal authority is

to

~ne

l~

S'cfci::~ent

effect that a complete instruction on reasonable doubt
to ad·:ise a jury of '.:l;e burdens that must be
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borne by each party and the manner in which it is to evaluate
and weigh the evidEnce presented in a criminal case.

Such an

instruction was given in this case.
Discussing the standard of review where
insufficiency of evidence is alleged this Court said:
It is the exclusive function of the
jury to weigh the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the
witnesses, and it is not within the
prerogative of this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of the factfinder.
This Court should only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that reasonable men could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a
rEasonable doubt (footnote omitted).
State v. Lamrr., 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980) at 231.

See also:

State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977); State v. Asay, 631
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah
1976); State v. Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980); State v.
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66
(Utah 1977); and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, "the evidence is to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict."

State v. Gorlick, 605

761 (Utah 1979).
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?.2,j

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities and arguments,
respondent respectfully submits that the conviction and
sentence of the appellant were proper and schould be affirmed
by this Court.

DATED this

0./-;!:::-1
day

of November, 1981.
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